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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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beyond their power. The Russians were then in full retreat and a rising
in the rear of the Germans,, without preparation, with no supplies and,
furthermore, without the consent of the already existing Polish Under-
ground, was out of the question. These Soviet agents found the problem
of survival to be of the greatest importance at this stage. Food was vital,
and since these Russian parachutists hidden in the forests were unable to
get at supplies., they took by force what little the villagers had been able
to keep by them.
From the early days of the autumn of 19413 as aforementioned, Moscow
had broadcast in the language of every occupied country and had called
for an immediate uprising against the Axis. Such demands met with an
energetic refusal from every Government in exile then residing in London.
In this field, the Moscow gamble was first able to attain a notable suc-
cess as far as Yugoslavia was concerned, but the action regarding Poland,
was begun in earnest only after the Kremlin had decided to break with
the Polish Government. From that moment, no longer bound by any
commitments, the Kremlin strongly emphasised its calls for an im-
mediate uprising in Poland, directly opposing its policy of an active
open resistance to the * limited action* executed by the Home Army,
under the orders of the Polish Government. A few quotations from
Moscow's Free Poland* revealed the trend of Russian propaganda on
this subject.
" Is it possible for people/5 wrote this paper "to be mobilised under
the banner of * wait/ of c passivity s ? . . . Those, who are hoping by
means of insinuation to create an abyss between the fighting partisans,
the people's vanguard and the whole nation, will be wrong. Who, giving
orders from abroad are in a position to forbid these people to take an active
part in the struggle ? 5 . . We consider the policy of inactivity, of waiting,
as treason and against the interests of Poland . . . The lying reasons regard-
ing avoiding unnecessary sacrifice of Polish people cannot be taken
seriously ..."
Had the Polish people responded to Free Poland's appeal from Moscow
and revolted there and then, the savage and sanguinary repression under-
taken by the Germans in reprisal would merely have been the continuation
of that exterminating action executed in Eastern Poland during 1939-1941.
Soviet propaganda put into the appeal every Polish national slogan, even
terming the Soviets the e defenders * of the Catholic religion. All
protests made by Sikorski against these appeals as being an e interference
with Poland's internal affairs' were repaid with interest by Soviet pro-
" Sikorski has no need to offer excuses for not raising the flag of rebellion,"
Wrote the same Free Poland a week later, " but a rebellion is not a Chinese
dragon which leaps out of a box at the touch of a spring . . . Sikorski
cannot summon a rebellion but he does proclaim the slogan of inactivity
with a clear conscience . . . Those who started the battle against the
* Wolna Polska, March 1st, 1943.                            ~~